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  The African continent has significantly suffered from a great number of civil wars and armed 
conflicts since the beginning of the independence era in late 1960s. On May 28, 1975, the 
creation of a regional The African continent has significantly suffered from a great number of 
civil wars and armed conflicts since organization in West Africa called the Economic 
Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) took place. The intent was to achieve "collective 
self-sufficiency" for its member states by building a full economic and trading union. In the late 
1990s, the maintenance of peace and security in the region was added to the ECOWAS mission 
statement. This thesis focuses on the important collaboration between the United Nations (UN) 
and the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) in resolving conflicts on the 
African continent. This subject is quite relevant today and this thesis examines the history and 
political achievements of the cooperation between the UN and ECOWAS in two cases, Liberia 
and The Gambia where both organizations were involved.  
 
  I argue here that while the relationship between the United Nations and ECOWAS has 
developed over time, the UN has been slow in responding to crises in West Africa.  I use Liberia 
as a case in point.  However, I also argue that the UN has begun to realize the need to collaborate 
with this regional organization as demonstrated in my second case of The Gambia.  I believe that 
preventive action combined with military deployment, if necessary, under the auspices of the 
UN, the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS can ensure peace, security, civilian human rights, 
rule of law and democracy in West Africa. The joint actions of these international organizations 





Chapter I: Introduction 
            The UN has implemented peacekeeping operations since 1948 and the Charter gives the 
United Nations Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security. According to the manual entitled United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 
(UNPO), Principles and Guidelines, issued in 2008 “United Nations peacekeeping operations are 
deployed on the basis of a mandate from the United Nations Security Council. The tasks that a 
United Nations peacekeeping operation will be required to perform are set out in the Security 
Council mandate.” (UNPO, 2008, 16).  Although the United Nations has developed several 
important programs in West Africa, it did not always manage these peacekeeping operations in 
the most optimal manner. Despite the UN’s economic programs and military missions, the UN 
has at times been weak in achieving the resolution of crises in West Africa. UN Peacekeeping 
operations that have taken place in West Africa including Western Sahara (1992), Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and recently The Gambia. The United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia 
(UNOMIL) was initially implemented in cooperation with ECOWAS from 1993 to 1997 during 
the first Liberian civil war. Therefore, the UN and ECOWAS have been working together for 
some time.  
               According to a UN Council Special Report (CSR) submitted by selected experts, 
peacekeeping operations “undertake critical missions, including stabilizing countries wracked by 
violence, protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian assistance, degrading illegal armed 
groups, running elections, and supporting public security and the rule of law.” (CSR, 2017, 1). 
UN peacekeeping operations have made an important contribution to peace and security and the 
UN cooperation with regional organizations such as ECOWAS enhances that effort. For this 




        Free and democratic elections have been essential element of peace agreements. Every year, 
free and democratic elections are held in West Africa as a number of countries organize local or 
even national elections. Very often, however, the political transition between incoming and 
outgoing governments can lead to an outbreak of violence, calling for an intervention of 
peacekeepers from ECOWAS and the UN. In addition to providing security and election 
monitoring, the UN has conducted social, economic and development programs (UNICEF, 
UNDP, UNHCR) in West African countries.  
 
        Together with regional organizations, namely ECOWAS and the Economic and Monetary 
Union of West African countries (UEMOA in French), UN programs include currently 
preventive actions intended to avoid electoral violence that potentially can lead to civil wars. 
 The auditing of the pre-electoral processes such as voter registration and establishing the 
electoral map have been key.  Also, UN-ECOWAS monitoring and observation during the 
elections are essential instruments to prevent the return of civil violence.  For example, following 
the two bloody civil wars in Liberia, the UN and ECOWAS played a major role in overseeing 
new elections. In addition, the most recent example of violence following an election that will be 
discussed later in this thesis is the 2016 presidential election in The Gambia. 
             However, the UN comes into the region as an outsider. In this regard, UN offices on the 
ground have not been well-equipped to comprehend local cultural factors and assess the risks of 
clashes between the local groups. Since 1989, however, the United Nations field offices in West 
Africa and ECOWAS have developed a synergy to put in place successful and effective policies. 
The Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) has been a significant player as a 




The effectiveness of ECOWAS policies relies on the use of inclusiveness and preventive 
diplomacy. I argue here that UN/ECOWAS cooperation has worked well but has been less 
efficient due to rules, regulations, and lack of communication that have slowed decision-making.  
 
              Peacekeeping operations are very important in West Africa in order to maintain peace 
and security in accordance with United Nations Charter. Lise Morjé Howard, for example, 
argues the need for the coordination of “legal capabilities” must be taken into consideration 
when joint institutions work together on the ground. Therefore, UN Security Council mandates 
must include legal provisions for ECOWAS. In fact, my argument supports Howard’s theory that 
there must be “basic organizational learning on the ground” (Howard, 2008, 18). I looked at the 
political implications of ECOWAS in the resolution of conflicts in Liberia in the 1990s and the 
2000s and in The Gambia in 2017 and the support provided by the United Nations in both cases, 
and argue that communication between ECOWAS, UN Headquarters and field offices remains 
absolutely a key component for the success of peacekeeping operations.  
            In addition, Howard clearly explains the relationship between the sustained interest of the 
UN Security Council and successes on the ground. Also Howard discusses in-depth the 
cooperation and communication between field offices in the region or country where the issue is 
located and UN headquarters. I agree with Howard’s claim that the effectiveness of UN organs 
on the grounds and their ability to learn quickly and adjust to new problems is essential for 
success. Also, regional organizations like ECOWAS have advantages that the UN may lack, in 
terms of primary knowledge of the situation and familiarity with local people, leaders and 
institutions that can contribute to a solution. Nevertheless, the UN can contribute funding, clear 





         In gathering my resources for this research, I will rely on academic writings, scholarly 
reviewed books, UN reports, ECOWAS publications and expert committees’ contributions to 
sustain my hypothesis. I expect these sources will reveal the success or failure of UN/ECOWAS 
cooperation in both Liberia and The Gambia and will uncover a lack of coordination between 
ECOWAS and the UN. The Liberia case demonstrates that UN mechanisms of communication 
with the field and its partnership with ECOWAS may not have taken into consideration the 
sociological realities in West African communities.   
          Also, data will be collected from UN studies and other regional organizations that provide 
data related to the budgeting, the size of the police force and military deployments in both cases. 
I will also gather information from reports and peer-reviewed publications related to the 
outcomes from the implementation of the joint policies (ECOWAS-UN) and projects overseen 
by the officers on the ground. In conclusion, I explore the lessons learned from the outcomes of 
those programs before making policy recommendations. 
        Studying the following cases of Liberia and The Gambia will help to demonstrate all 
necessary changes needed for a better managed cooperation between ECOWAS and United 
Nations. I will examine the historical backgrounds, UN Security Council resolutions that 
supported or at times undermined on ECOWAS mechanisms for the deployment of troops and 
the mandate of ECOMOG. At the conclusions of the case studies, I will propose some policy 
recommendations based on the evidence reported by major agencies on the ground. 
    In my conclusion, I suggest building an international framework and international 




African States and the United Nations and support the successful achievement of their joint 
missions.  
        Since the tenure of former UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon, UN agencies have studied 
many ways to improve their relationship with ECOWAS member states. Compared with other 
African regional organizations, ECOWAS has strongly advocated for more freedom of action. 
However, ECOWAS lacks major funding, available and unified military capabilities and 
strategies to prevent effectively civil wars. I argue that ECOWAS needs more freedom of actions 
and needs full support by the United Nations in order to handle all emerging crises in a timely 
manner. ECOWAS has gained international accountability while intervening in member states in 
order restore order, peace and security.  Beyond working with the UN, ECOWAS has worked 
closely with African Union (AU) bodies to maintain multilateral frameworks for awareness of 
imminent dangers and the adoption of effective preventive mechanisms. 
       However, that inclusive process requires an extended inter-agency cooperation between 
ECOWAS, AU and UN to prevent any delay by member states due to bureaucracy and selfish 
political interests. Preventive action is now a major consideration by UN, AU and ECOWAS 
organizations in order to prevent civil wars. It is hoped that this thesis will shed light on how to 




Chapter II: Review of literature 
                 UN reports and peer-reviewed readings discussed below demonstrate that the UN has 
failed at times to decide efficiently on how to handle sudden outbreaks of unrest that have led to 
bloody consequences. This thesis focuses on two case studies, Liberia and The Gambia, to 
explain the roles of the UN and ECOWAS, including their cooperation in the implementation of 
joint programs.  
             Lise Morjé Howard argues that UN military forces and civilian organizations on the 
ground should cooperate with the local leadership and should have more legal capacity for 
decision-making. Howard’s primary interest is in how UN personnel learned to “to recognize 
tho0s dynamics and so alter the goals of the warring parties, and change the UN operations on 
the ground in light of new understandings of problems”. (Howard, 2008, 19). The fast adoption 
of effective resolutions for peacekeeping operations with strong and clear mandates depends on 
the interests of the Security Council members. The UN Security Council’s interest in a matter is 
likely related the level and the nature of the diplomatic relationships between UN five permanent 
(P5) members and the country hosting the civil war. In fact, the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) has been very diligent in exercising preventive action with the 
support of United Nations. In addition, Howard argues that the willingness of all parties to 
resolve their disagreements peacefully is very critical to the success of UN peacekeeping 
operations. The benefits of such analysis, are shown by Howard’s fine study of six cases in 
which UN peacekeeping was successful, mainly in 1990s (Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, 
Mozambique, Eastern Slovenia, and East Timor).  
    In reference to those UN peacekeeping operations around the world, Howard mentions that 




the civil war. The expected emergency response by the UN Security Council has often failed to 
meet high expectations of local communities and civilians who are major victims and 
neighboring states in the cases of Liberia and The Gambia.  
     In complement to Howard, a UN Council Special Report (CSR), dated in 2017, mentions, in 
light of recent “peacekeeping partnership” (CSR, 2017, 8), that members states to UN 
peacekeeping operations fail, often times, to cooperate effectively with host-country 
governments. This report proposes many urgent mechanisms that must be adopted by UN organs 
in order to guarantee a successful implementation of peacekeeping operations, mostly in Africa.  
     In fact, Article 39 of the UN Charter authorizes the UN Security Council to determine the 
existence of a threat to “the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression.” (United Nations, 1948, 
1).  In addition, the CSR reports, “international division of labor during peacekeeping operations 
is controversial and unsustainable. Countries that mandate United Nations (UN) missions are 
often different from those that provide the uniformed personnel and contribute major funding.” 
(CSR, 2017, 3). This report mentions also deep disagreements between Security Council 
members, financial contributors (member states as donors). There are also strained relations 
between UN financial offices accounted for funding management and the host country 
government. Misunderstandings related to administrative hierarchy, personnel assignments and 
decision-making processes arise also between host country governmental bodies and UN 
agencies on the ground.  
In addition, troubles arose between UN field offices and deployed ECOWAS forces while 
implementing legal mechanisms. This is due to their different types of military hierarchy and 




      Paul D Williams (2013) has conducted in-depth research on the causes of civil wars and 
mechanisms of peacekeeping operations in Africa. He also studied the military contributions by 
African countries and the support provided by the United Nations. Williams mentions more than 
50 peace operations that included the protection of civilians, conflict prevention, ceasefire 
enforcement and the implementation of peace agreements. Out of these fifty peace operations, 
ten took place or are still ongoing in West Africa. After exploring the Liberia and The Gambia 
cases, I will mention the current level of cooperation in terms peacekeeping operations and 
provide policy recommendations for more successful outcomes in terms of civilians’ security and 
democratic rule of law. Jeremy Sarkin claims that “in the 45 years to 2001, 80 successful and 
108 unsuccessful coups took place in Africa, nearly half them in West Africa” (Sarkin, 2009, 2). 
This proves that UN has always been focused on peace and stability in Africa. In order to deal 
with this persistent instability, Sarkin claims that “placing peacekeepers on the ground” can be a 
solution to prevent crises in countries facing poverty, food shortage and lack of access to potable 
water and protect human rights of their citizens. Sarkin claims also, “while in 2002 there were 
31,000 peacekeepers on the ground in Africa (from the UN and AU), the number was more than 
60,000 by 2007.”(Sarkin, 2009, 18). Sarkin’s observation makes sense and supports the idea that 
the size and the strength of deployed peacekeepers makes a difference.  
      The types of the mandate are provided depending on the conditions on the ground and the 
full cooperation with the host country government. This assertion has been historically 
confirmed by the delayed reaction of UN Security Council in 1993 to the civil war in Liberia.  In 
fact, the United Nations Security Council only adopted its first resolution in 1993 to support 
ECOMOG whose forces were deployed in Liberia in 1991. Local populations blamed UN 




Chapter III: Liberia: Case study of a long ongoing civil war 
          This chapter examines Liberia’s first civil war from 1989 to 1997. The Armed Forces of 
Liberia, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and Independent National Patriotic Front 
of Liberia  (INPFL), among others,  and the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) 
formed by state members were the major players during the civil wars in Liberia.  
    However, those main components underwent changes during the second civil war due to the 
strong influence of UNOMIL in 1993 that later became UNMIL in 2003. This chapter does not 
include the relationships between the Liberian civil war and the crisis in Sierra Leone. It focuses 
on the great contributions of ECOWAS and the UN to end peacefully the civil wars in Liberia 
and their joint efforts to enforce UNMIL peacekeeping operations that prevented chaos in the 
region and restored order after free, fair and democratic elections. 
A: History of the conflict: 
          Liberia’s civil crisis goes far back in Liberian history to 1979. Nathalie Brown recalls that 
“in 1980, Samuel Doe, a 28-year old Master Sergeant in the Liberian National Guard, led a coup 
d'état” (Brown:1999:7). Doe and his followers stormed the executive mansion, assassinated 
President Tolbert and his immediate security forces, and formed a revolutionary government.  
The bicameral Parliament of Liberia, known as the Legislature, was dissolved in April 1980. 
This was the beginning of a dictatorship that divided the country.  
        Samuel Doe was from the Krahn ethnic group. Clashes erupted consequently between some 
ethnic groups during a period of tension marked by political instability, social crisis and waves of 
protests.  It was mostly visible in 1985 when ethnic groups namely, Gios, Manos and other 
minorities in the Nimba County started waging war among themselves. Among them, the Gios 




comrade who fell out with Samuel Doe,  fled the country and went into exile in the United 
States. Global Security’s report mentions “under pressure from the United States and other 
creditors, in July 1984, Doe’s government issued a new constitution that allowed the return of 
political parties outlawed since 1980.”(GlobalSecurity, 2018, 1). All political parties that had 
rebelled came back to demand a change in government.  
          At this time, each candidate was supported by his ethnic group in accordance with its 
cultural rules. Each ethnic group or coalition of ethnic groups had its own candidate for the 
presidential election that was held on October 15, 1985. Gios and Mandingos claimed that 
President Samuel Doe’s regime rigged the presidential election. The majority of the international 
community shared that view. The U.S. embassy in Monrovia under the leadership of H.E. 
Ambassador Edwards Perkins deployed nine observers but refused to comment on the results of 
the 1985 presidential election. No international observers declared the 1985 presidential election 
as free and fair. 
              Reports by international organizations such as ECOWAS and non-governmental 
organizations namely Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) agree that 
the roots of the Liberian civil wars are also related to income inequalities, uneven access to 
property and the management of natural resources. The United Nations Common Country 
Assessment that was conducted in 2006 identified some key conflict dynamics in terms of factors 
that accounted for the violent conflict. For example, the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups were 
well known for trading and business relationships and dominated the market.  The relationship 
between economic power and ethnic distribution of wealth, unequal management of resources 




This cocktail of factors led to a bloody civil war between Samuel Doe’s supporters and those of 
Charles Ghankay Taylor.  
           A Human Rights Watch report (1993) claims that President Doe retaliated and “engaged 
in bloody reprisals against suspected opponents from Gio and Mano ethnic groups and brutally 
suppressed a military coup attempt on November 12, 1985, led by Patrick Qwiwonkpa, a Gio.” 
Following his abortive coup, Thomas Quiwonkpa was captured by the Doe’s Krahn-dominated 
army and executed in Monrovia and his body parts were displayed in many locations of the 
capital city. Amnesty International reported in 1992 that, following the failed military coup, the 
Krahn-dominated Liberian Armed Forces (AFL) subsequently implemented a vigorous 
repression and all political opposition was abolished by Doe’s regime. On December 24, 1989, 
Charles Ghankay Taylor launched a rebellious incursion from Ivory Coast into the Nimba 
County. This action was also called a failed attempted coup by Doe’s government but Taylor 
claimed to restore the people’s will for change.  
            In fact, Charles Taylor’s mother was a member of the Gola ethnic group, part of the 
majority (mostly 95%) of the people who are indigenous in Liberia. His father was an American 
Liberian (descended from African-American colonists) who worked as a teacher, sharecropper, 
lawyer and judge. Charles Taylor rallied the civilians who were affiliated with victims of Doe’s 
AFL forces.  Grieving Gios and Manos also joined Taylor’s troops to retaliate against President 
Samuel Doe’s regime.  In June 1990, Gios and Manos orphans, seeking revenge, joined Charles 
Taylor in great numbers.   
            UN bodies on the ground and the international community were unable to stop the 
unlawful actions by Doe’s AFL troops. In fact, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch 




         Doe’s supporters from his own Krahn ethnic group perpetrated public executions and 
armed attacks against civilian protests calling for Doe’s resignation. Even when those crimes 
were reported to local law enforcement agencies, they remained unpunished.  
             Led by Charles Taylor, the rebel group adopted the name National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia (NPFL) and received the support of the young people from the minority Gios and Manos 
groups. The NPFL’s attack against the AFL troops was launched on December 24, 1989, into the 
Nimba County and Doe’s AFL planned a strategic military response. Liberia fell into civil war 
following an AFL counterinsurgency that caused 160,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) to 
move in the direction of Guinea Conakry and Cote d’Ivoire. The number of IDPs reached 
700,000 by the end of 1990.    
          Non-governmental organizations’ (NGOs) reports reveal, “on the night of July 29-30, 
1990, AFL soldiers massacred some 600 people - mostly, Gios and Manos, many of them 
women with children- who had sought refuge at St Peter’s Church in Monrovia”. Approximately 
30 ethnic Krahn government soldiers carried out the Monrovia Church massacre. This was the 
worst single atrocity of the First Liberian Civil War.  
          All parties ignored UN calls for peace. A Human Rights Watch report (2003) states that 
the United Nations calls had a domino effect. In fact, “masked soldiers attacked the UN 
compound in Monrovia, shooting indiscriminately and abducted 40 internally displaced persons 
whose dead bodies were found in the bushy slums the following day on September 1990. That 
level of sudden violence by the AFL caused the departure of UN personnel that did not return 
until November 1990.” (HRW: 2003). This attack shows the inability of major nongovernmental 
organizations and other religious associations on the ground to convince warring parties to 




          On August 23, 1990, in accordance with the "ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia", 3,500 
troops from ECOWAS Member States, including Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and 
Gambia deployed to Liberia under the name of ECOMOG forces. Their mission was 
peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance and their tasks included:  the imposition of a cease-
fire, the disarmament of the warring parties, ending the carnage of civilians, the imposition of an 
embargo on the acquisition and import of arms, the establishment of an interim government and 
preparation for elections and the evacuation of foreign nationals.  
          The United Nations field offices reopened in Liberia after the signature of two peace-
agreements, one in Banjul (The Gambia) in August 1990 and a second one in Bamako (Mali) in 
November 28, 1990. Taylor’s group planned strategies for revenge and looked for additional 
funding in order to buy arms and ammunition to counter the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL)’s 
military power. For example, illegal gold mining was one of the ways to create wealth to 
purchase arms and other equipment. In addition, Charles Taylor and the NPFL targeted 
“suspected supporters” of Doe’s regime.  
          Revengeful NPFL militants slaughtered civilians, burned down villages and plantations, 
and looted businesses along the way. Anyone presumed to be a collaborator of the Krahns and 
Mandingos was badly reprimanded. For example, the Grebo and Vai ethnic groups that were 
business partners of the Mandingos and Krahns were threatened and forced to flee the country 
and seek refuge in neighboring Ivory Coast. The NPFL employed brutal tactics aimed at 
terrorizing the civilian population. NPFL rebels routinely mutilated female and male genitals 
following rape and extensive torture sessions.  
         Taylor was against the deployment of ECOMOG which sought to protect the interim 




because he claimed to be the Liberian legitimate leader. The transformation was complete after 
ECOMOG helped to install the interim government in Monrovia. Simultaneously, Taylor formed 
his own "government" in Gbarnga (Brown, 1999:10). These two acts deeply divided Liberia and 
forced ECOMOG to choose sides in support of the interim government that was recognized by 
ECOWAS and led by Amos Sawyer, former Vice-President of the dissolved National Assembly 
who became the Interim President. 
B. Role of ECOWAS 
      The Liberian case study demonstrates one of the most successful actions by a sub-regional 
organization (ECOWAS) in terms of conflict management. Until summer 1990, Liberia’s civil 
war spread throughout the country. NPFL militants surpassed all strategies of containment by the 
Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). All major European and American diplomatic missions in 
Liberia issued simultaneous statements declaring the civil war as “collective suicide” and Liberia 
as a “land of anarchy” (Amnesty International, 1999:2).  Those official statements of foreign 
governments were evidence of the seriousness of the first Liberian civil war and the need for 
urgent action by the international community or other governments in the region to save 
civilians, mostly women, young children, the elderly and the disabled. 
      ECOWAS was well informed about all atrocities committed by all sides. ECOWAS called an 
emergency meeting and decided to create and deploy the Economic Community of West Africa 
States Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces to Liberia. The former Nigerian President 
His Excellency Ibrahim Babangida proposed the deployment of ECOMOG forces. ECOMOG 





C: The deployment of the ECOMOG forces 
           ECOMOG was a key component of the ECOWAS Peace Plan: The Peacemaking 
Framework. The ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) proposed it during its 
meeting from 6 to 7 August 1990. The Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) 
and the United Nations endorsed the plan. Michelle Pitts (Pitts, 1999:2) studied the deployment 
of ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In August 1990, 2,700 ECOMOG troops deployed 
from Sierra Leone, most of whom were Nigerians. Nigeria had 70,000 citizens living in Liberia 
at the onset of the civil war, according to Brown (Brown: 1999:13). Nigerians were businessmen, 
gold miners and fully integrated into the Liberian society.  
          According to Pitts, “the ECOMOG force commander, Ghanaian General Arnold Quainoo 
believed that the presence of the West African force so near to Liberia's border would cause 
factions to halt fighting in Liberia's capital of Monrovia.” (Pitts, 1999:4). Unfortunately, that was 
not the case and tensions intensified between NPFL, AFL and local affiliates. Quainoo decided 
to deploy troops into Liberia to protect civilians and negotiate a ceasefire. On 25 August 1990, 
ECOMOG troops arrived in Monrovia. The presence of the large, well-equipped ECOMOG 
forces frightened both the Liberian AFL and NPFL troops and led to a ceasefire. An interim 
government was then put in place to handle urgent administrative tasks. Unfortunately, Taylor 
refused to cooperate with the ECOMOG force. However, Taylor continued his efforts to try to 
dominate and rule Liberia. His aggression led to substantial violence against civilian 




          The failures of his strategies imposed his acceptance to join the negotiations of peace 
agreements, signed in 1990 in Bamako - Mali (on 28 November 1990) and Banjul - The Gambia 
(on 21 December 1990). 
            In her report to the US Department of State, Brown mentions “additionally, by 1995 
ECOMOG had also assumed the onerous task of protecting some 160 United Nations Observer 
Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) observers.” (Brown, 1999:11) Despite ECOMOG's multiple 
personalities and ever-changing responsibilities, the body would facilitate thirteen peace 
agreements; oversee the disarmament of 24,000 combatants; create a safe environment for 
transparent elections; distribute ballot boxes and other election materials; and provide security 
for the July 1997 presidential and national elections. (Brown, 1999:11). 
          The ECOMOG troops deployed for the first time in August 1990 in Monrovia as a 
peacekeeping force but its duties expanded in response to the realities on the ground. In his book 
named Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa; Building 
Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau, Adekeye Adebajo (2003) 
describes the complexity of the ECOMOG mission in Liberia. Samuel Doe’s regime made 
accusations of sabotage by other ECOWAS member states such as Nigeria and Ghana and 
delayed consensus within ECOWAS.  Burkina Faso and Libya were also accused of providing 
military training and financial support to the 160 NPFL combatants who perpetrated the Nimba 
County attack December 24, 1989. Therefore, it was difficult to reach an agreement on the 
mandate of the ECOMOG mission. Some countries such as Senegal chose to remain neutral. 
(HRW, 1993:6) Out of the fifteen member states, only four provided troops to ECOMOG 




12,000 troops with the vast majority coming from The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone 
(HRW, 1993:3). Mali joined later at the end of 1990.  
         After the November 1990 cease-fire, the Senegalese Armed Forces joined the ongoing 
peace process in September 1991. The well-equipped ECOMOG forces kept Taylor’s troops out 
of Monrovia, the capital city. Before its departure in 1998, ECOMOG force was the only source 
of stability in Liberia. It had negotiated peace accords and cease-fires, disarmed rebels, 
evacuated expatriates, and created conditions for transparent elections. 
 





  Misunderstandings arose among deployed troops of the member states. Military management 
was not smooth between French speaking countries and English speaking countries.  
Tensions affected the management of the forces or interfered with ceasefire negotiations. In 
addition, Taylor’s troops, Doe’s supporters and few community activists accused ECOMOG 
forces of overstepping their mission. ECOMOG Field Commander Maj. General Adetunji Olurin 
of Nigeria met with representatives of Diplomatic missions, NGOs and UN Staff on the ground 
and explained, in details, the mandate of ECOMOG in order to appease their concerns related to 
the reluctance of Liberia to cooperate. Olurin minimized Taylor’s criticism and assured that 
ECOMOG peacekeeping force was supposed to act as an "impartial arbiter"(Raddatz, 2013:189). 
Therefore, ECOMOG forces could not take sides with any party to the conflict whether it is AFL 
or NPFL.   
       Together with the United Nations, ECOWAS organized a number of rounds of negotiations 
to try to bring peace to Liberia. From 1990 to 1997 (year of election of President Charles 
Ghankay Taylor), ECOWAS brokered the following peace process gatherings and included all 
warring parties: 
- Banjul - The Gambia (August 1990); 
- Bamako - Mali (28 November 1990); 
- Banjul - The Gambia (December 1990); 
- Lomé - Togo (February 1991); 
- Yamoussoukro- Côte d’Ivoire (June 1991); 
- Yamoussoukro- Côte d’Ivoire (July 1991); 
- Yamoussoukro- Côte d’Ivoire (September 1991); 




- Cotonou - Benin (25 July 1993); 
- Akosombo and Accra- Ghana (1994); 
- Abuja I - Nigeria (19 August 1995); 
- Abuja II- Nigeria (17 August 1996). 
   The culminating Abuja agreement resulted in the holding of elections in 1997. The different 
locations where negotiations took place, demonstrate strongly the collective willingness of 
ECOWAS member states to find peaceful solutions to the first Liberian civil war. A report issued 
in June 1993 by Human Rights Watch called ECOMOG, a “successful military intervention that 
succeeded in temporarily stopping the bloodshed and ethnic killing” (HRW,1993:1).  
Many international observers regarded ECOMOG as a model of regional conflict resolution. 
This long lasting period of mediation among warring parties demonstrates the full commitment 
of ECOWAS and UN to the peaceful resolutions of conflicts. The success of ECOMOG in 
Liberia led to similar deployments in Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire to carry out the same type 
of missions.  
D: Role of the United Nations in the Liberian civil wars 
       The United Nations issued its first resolution on the Liberian civil war more than two years 
after the beginning of armed conflict. The United Nations Security Council resolution 788, 
adopted unanimously on 19 November 1992, determined that the deterioration of the situation 
in Liberia constituted a threat to international peace and security. The Council imposed an arms 
embargo on the country for the purposes of establishing peace and stability. However, this 
delayed response of UNSC led to increased military activities involving AFL troops, NPL militia 




  In 1993, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution UNSCR 866 (1993), the United 
Nations’ Observer Mission (UNOMIL) was created by the UN and was later entrusted with the 
mandate to investigate and report on human rights violations in Liberia. UNOMIL had three 
human rights officers with the responsibility of submitting human rights reports to the UN 
Secretary-General. UNOMIL’s mandate expired at the end of September 1997. The United 
Nations congratulated ECOWAS for its intervention in Liberia.   
The UN Security Council resolution S/RES/788, dated 19 November 1992 “welcomed the 
continued commitment of the ECOWAS and the efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the 
Liberian conflict” (S/RES/788:1). The United Nations Security Council also invited “all States to 
respect the measures established by ECOWAS to bring about a peaceful solution to the conflict 
in Liberia”.( S/RES/788:1). The Security Council Resolution expressed appreciation for the 
contributions of the European countries in line of ECOWAS recommendations. The UNSC also 
“decided, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that all States shall, for the 
purposes of establishing peace and stability in Liberia, immediately implement a general and 
complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia until the 
Security Council decides otherwise.” (S/RES/788:2). This decision of the Security Council was 
very much appreciated by ECOWAS.  
         The same UN resolution provided international legitimacy to ECOMOG forces and 
facilitated the mission of its troops on the ground. In addition, it included an arms embargo and 
imposed the elimination of all supplying routes for arms and ammunition to parties to the 
conflict. This UN resolution gave credit to the ECOWAS political leadership in the region and 
supported ECOMOG operations forces. Such operations intended the use of military capabilities 




             The UN resolution authorized therefore to impose order until the organization of free, 
fair and peaceful democratic elections. The same UN resolution recommended the appointment 
of a Special Representative to Liberia to evaluate the situation and report to the Security Council.  
            The Abuja II Peace Agreement of 1996 called for the organization of fair and democratic 
elections on July 1, 1997. This mechanism was strongly supported by the United Nations. All 
parties to the conflict were required to disarm, establish civilian political parties and participate 
in the electoral campaign. Charles Taylor was elected President of Liberia. In addition to the UN, 
the African Union and the Mano River Union framework also played significant roles.  
        Nevertheless, fighting continued and frustration with Charles Taylor’s corrupt and 
repressive measures that ultimately led to his forced departure from the country into exile in 
Nigeria.  The AU launched a mission for Comprehensive Peace Agreement and reconstruction in 
Liberia in 2004 following the Accra (Ghana, 2003) peace accord. Following the “rehatting” of 
ECOMOG forces to Blue Helmets, many resolutions were taken by UN Security Council to 
support the peacekeeping operations. 
            In the same year, the United Nations Security Council adopted two resolutions UNSCR 
1497 (2003) and UNSCR 1509 (2003) to put in place the long-term United Nations Stabilization 
force in Liberia (UNMIL). UNMIL relieved the ECOMOG forces and successfully completed its 
mandate on 30 March 2018.  The ECOMOG intervention caused numerous casualties in the 
ranks of ECOWAS soldiers and all rebel groups. Weaknesses during the transitional period 
between ECOMOG drawdown and the deployment of UNMIL served the NPFL to commit 
atrocities. No official estimates of casualties were formally made by ECOWAS.  
          The United Nations re-hatted all ECOMOG forces as UN Peacekeepers and implemented 




females into the service. In Liberia, the ECOMOG mission has been able to counter military 
actions against the rebel factions due to a strong commitment of member states to peace, security 
and stability in the ECOWAS region. At the same time, local traditional and religious leaders’ 
participation to the success of ECOMOG mission cannot be ignored. Traditional leaders have 
been very active in dissuading civilians from joining any parties to conflict and assisted 
ECOMOG in gaining the confidence of the local communities. Also, the traditional leaders have 
greatly contributed to ECOWAS’ efforts to bring peace in Liberia. They invited AFL and NPFL 
to cease all military activities and resolve issues through a mediation process. Their actions 
intended to influence peacefully the community and were a great contribution to ECOWAS 
efforts in Liberia. 
E: Lessons Learned 
            The Liberian civil wars lasted approximatively for seventeen years. During this time, 
both ECOWAS and the United Nations continuously sought innovative and synergistic 
approaches to peace operations in Liberia. The experience of ECOMOG forces to bring an end to 
the first Liberian civil war was very relevant for preventing future threats in the region.  The 
deployment of ECOMOG forces remains vital to the preservation of the stability in the region. 
The necessity and mandate of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa may be questioned since 
the ECOMOG force was able to demonstrate the ability of ECOWAS to establish and maintain 
peace in the region. Observations by High-level African Union (AU) appointees note that 
ECOWAS should always request AU and UN Security Council support prior to actions. 
ECOWAS officials responded that regional organizations are always implementing mediation or 




also note that the rapid onset of events on the ground may require sub-regional organizations to 
act without consultation with regional or international support.  
              In that respect, I agree with Ruggeri, Andrea, Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, and Han 
Dorussen (2013) who claim “interventions such as the United Nations Angola Verification 
Mission III (UNAVEM) in Angola (1995) and ECOMOG intervention in Liberia (2003) are 
good examples of sub-regional forces seeking to enforce or provide the context for 
democratization in the long run.”  The military operation was an option on the table in case of 
Liberia.  
            The fact that ECOWAS undertook such initiative represented a significant shift in the 
involvement of regional organizations in peace and security issues. Kwaja mentions, “this was 
underscored by an earlier call by Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary General of the 
United Nations, to the effect that regional organizations should reduce the pressure faced by the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in peacekeeping.” (Kwaja, 2017:57).  In addition, 
ECOWAS has a legal mandate provided by Member States to maintain peace and security in 
West Africa. I concur with Chukwuma Osakwe that the deployment of “ECOMOG both in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone had encountered many internal issues that influenced its legitimacy and 
effectiveness” (Osakwe, 2017:109). There were a few problems between Nigeria and Ghana and 
the “francophone countries”. Osakwe points out that Nigeria is unilateral funding of ECOMOG 
operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone did not please Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal.  
That caused those member states to remain neutral and negatively influenced the credibility of 
ECOMOG’s mandate.  
        Nathalie E. Brown from the US Department of State explains, in great details, the issues 




levels of economic and social development, the lack of a common currency and differing styles 
of governance, including military dictatorships” (Brown, 1999: 2).  Brown also reminds that 
ECOWAS member states had different “experiments with Marxism and socialism quasi-success 
and some of them underwent “several failures in instituting democratic practices”. (Brown, 1999: 
2). Those factors were unfortunately “obstacles to the formation of a common market and 
economic integration.” (Brown, 1999: 2). I also agree with the argument that UN mechanisms 
are sometimes slow to respond to the urgent conditions and needs on the ground.  
         However, ECOWAS succeeded in restoring and maintaining peace and order in the region 
without UN support. Brown states “over the objections of some member states, ECOWAS 
created and deployed a military force to Liberia.”  The five-nation 3,500-person force that landed 
in Monrovia in 1990 would swell to a presence of more than 10,000 and represent the majority of 
the Community by 1996. Before leaving Liberia in 1998, ECOMOG had negotiated peace 
accords and cease-fires, disarmed rebels, evacuated expatriates, and created conditions for 
transparent elections in July 1997. 
         The UN succeeded in shaping agreements and in the implementation of disarmament, 
demobilization and reinsertion of former rebels in Liberia. The United Nations efficiently funded 
programs that served civilians, women and children and its actions supported ECOWAS’ “noble 
ambitions in establishing a permanent peacekeeping mechanism” despite the lack of sufficient 
funding (Brown: 1999:17). The Gambian case will be discussed in Chapter IV to demonstrate the 




Chapter IV: The Gambia: A case study of preventive action to impose the rule of law 
 
       This chapter reviews the ECOWAS involvement and effectiveness in the peaceful transfer of 
power in 2016 between the outgoing President of The Gambia, Alhadji Sheikh Professor Doctor 
Yahya A.J.J Babili Mansa Jammeh, and the President-elect Adama Barrow. The Gambian 
presidential election took place on December 1, 2016.  This chapter focuses on the crisis 
following Jammeh’s refusal to respect the results of the presidential election, released on 
December 1, 2016. It also emphasizes actions taken by ECOWAS to achieve a peaceful transfer 
of power to President-elect Barrow. It also shows how a partnership among ECOWAS, the 
African Union (AU), and the United Nations (UN) can help to prevent civil wars in West Africa 
following elections. 
       The Gambia has been member of ECOWAS since its creation in 1975. In accordance with 
the ECOWAS Mediation Guidelines, “electoral observation requires an invitation from national 
authorities of ECOWAS Member States.” (ECOWAS, 2008, 3). During this presidential election, 
Jammeh’s regime refused to allow the ECOWAS Observation Team to monitor the December 
2016 presidential voting process.  
 
       In the case of The Gambia, negotiations for a peaceful transition following the election were 
unsuccessful. However, in order to avoid bloodshed, ECOWAS deployed the ECOWAS Military 
Intervention in The Gambia (ECOMIG), a multinational regional military force to ensure a 






A: History of the conflict 
           President Jammeh came to power in The Gambia in 1994 following a military coup 
against President Dawda Jawara. President Jammeh ruled with an iron fist. His brutality included 
mass incarcerations that attracted the attention of the international community. According to 
reports by Human Rights Watch (2015) and Amnesty International (2016), his opponents’ 
disappearances related to their protests against corruption, money-laundering crimes, and arms 
trafficking. In May 2015, the US National Security Adviser Susan Rice mentioned in a public 
statement that she was “deeply concerned about credible reports of torture, suspicious 
disappearances and arbitrary detention at the government’s hands.” (HRW, 2016:2).  
          During years of dictatorship and political unrest, many of President Jammeh’s political 
opponents were incarcerated and died in jail without formal trials or disappeared right after being 
arrested by Gambian police or military forces. The Gambian law-enforcement agencies arrested, 
in April 2016, Ebrima Solo Sandeng an opposition activist who died while in custody.  
Nine former senior officials of the Gambian National Intelligence Agency (NIA) are currently 
charged for Sandeng’s death and the torture of other opposition members. They remain in 
custody awaiting trial. 
                    The Government of Senegal suspected that President Jammeh supported the 
Mouvement Democratique des Forces de la Casamance (MFDC), literally translated as 
Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance, a rebel group claiming the independence of the 
South of Senegal. MFDC has been at war against the Senegalese governmental Armed Forces 
(SAF) since 1981 and Jammeh’s Djola ethnic group is dominant in Casamance. President 
Jammeh’s party, the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC) is believed to 




Both Senegalese governments and the majority of the Gambians believe MFDC rebels carried 
out operations such as killings, sabotage of opposition protests and kidnappings from their base 
in southern Senegal under President Jammeh’s instructions. In order to maintain influence over 
the MFDC, President Jammeh often refused to cooperate with successive Senegalese Presidents 
in the development of infrastructure projects and law-enforcement stations in Casamance (south 
of Senegal). The government of Senegal needed the cooperation of The Gambia in order to 
develop the southern part of their country by building the bridge over The Gambia River and 
highways for public commute in their southern cities (such as Kolda, Ziguinchor, and Tanaff and 
so on). (See map page 20). 
B: Role of ECOWAS 
             Paul D Williams (IPI, 2018:2) states that on December 1, 2016, “Gambians took the 
polls and successfully replaced then President Jammeh with current President Adama Barrow, a 
novice in politics and candidate of the United Democratic Party (UDP).  The results showed 45.5 
percent of the polls voted for Adama Barrow and’s 36.7 percent for Jammeh.” (Williams, 
2018:2).  
       President Jammeh conceded, during a televised speech, to Adama Barrow on the evening of 
December 2, 2016 after the Gambian Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) proclaimed the 
preliminary results declaring Adama Barrow President-elect. President Jammeh also saluted the 
maturity of the Gambian people for participating in a free, fair and democratic election. 
Nonetheless, President Jammeh’s party, the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction 





          On December 6, 2016, the Gambian Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) issued a 
second statement revising the initial results. The revisions showed a slight decrease of 20,000 
votes from the 525,963 initially reported. However, the IEC confirmed that Adama Barrow won 
the presidential election.    
          On December 9, 2016, President Jammeh surprisingly addressed Gambians on television 
and announced his refusal to step down. President Jammeh claimed that the voting system was 
rigged against him. President Jammeh dissolved the Gambian Independent Electoral 
Commission (IEC).The Gambian Armed Forces (GAF) stormed the National Television Station 
(called Gambia Radio and Television Services or GRTS), the Parliament and the IEC. At the 
same time, President Jammeh called for the organization of a new presidential election. The 2017 
Freedom Press report notes “Jammeh administration shut down internet access on the eve of 
2016 presidential election for 48 hours.” (Freedom Press, 2017). President Jammeh attempted to 
restrict public access to information about the voting process and election results. 
    Following urgent calls by ECOWAS Member States, Senegal and Nigeria, a high-level 
ECOWAS-AU-UN delegation was dispatched on December 13, 2016, to Banjul, the Gambian 
capitol to persuade Jammeh to leave office.  
         The delegation included Presidents Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (Liberia), Muhammadu Buhari 
(Nigeria), Dramani John Mahama (Ghana), and Ernest Bai Koroma of Sierra Leone and the UN 
Special Representative for West Africa and in the Sahel based in Senegal (UNOWAS), 
Mohamed Ibn Chambas who was also a former ECOWAS High Commissioner. On December 
17, 2016, eleven out of the fifteen Heads of ECOWAS Member States met for the Fiftieth 
Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, (also called the 




        The Summit appointed His Excellency President Muhammadu Buhari (Nigeria) as the 
Mediator, His Excellency President Dramani John Mahama (Ghana), Co-Mediator and 
Excellencies Presidents Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (Liberia) and Ernest Bai Koroma of Sierra Leone 
as members of the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC). Mr. Marcel A. de Souza, ECOWAS 
High Commissioner implemented the decision by the Summit of ECOWAS Authority to start 
mediation efforts under the leadership of the Standing Mediation Committee. 
 
                                                             Map of The Gambia: (Source Google Maps) 
 
 
C: Background of ECOWAS deployment in The Gambia (ECOMIG): 
 
   The Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) was sent to discuss the political impasse and 
convince President Jammeh to accept the election results and hand over the power peacefully. 




Heads of State and Government also decided to participate in the formal inauguration of 
Barrow’s presidency in Dakar on January 19, 2017. The ECOWAS Summit of Heads of States 
declared its intent to take all necessary measures to enforce the results of the presidential election 
as agreed in the final resolution of the 50th Summit.  
 
                 This ECOWAS decision is in accordance with ECOWAS 2001 Protocol on 
Democracy and Good Governance that defines 12 constitutional principles. Articles 1b and 1c 
state “every accession to power must be made through free, fair and transparent elections” and 
reflect the principle of “zero tolerance for power obtained by unconstitutional means.” 
(ECOWAS: 2001). Hartmann notes “Chambas (a member of the ECOWAS-AU-UN delegation) 
did not rule out this military possibility when asked if the UN would consider military action to 
force Jammeh’s departure.” (Hartmann: 2017, 89). Hartmann also states that “Chambas declared 
that ECOWAS would ask the UN Security Council to approve the deployment of troops to The 
Gambia if Jammeh (refused) to cede power.” (Hartmann: 2017, 89). The 50th ECOWAS Summit 
also agreed to guarantee the safety and protection of the President-elect Barrow.  
              Senegal proposed that President-elect Barrow and his family leave The Gambia and stay 
temporarily in Dakar for their own safety. The African Union, the United Nations and ECOWAS 
issued multiple joint declarations calling for President Jammeh to step down in order to preserve 
peace. Alieu Momar Njai, President of the IEC oversaw the presidential election and received 
death threats by the APRC, President Jammeh’s militants and the GAF. He fled the country and 
sought refuge in Senegal on January 4, 2017. On January 13, 2017, further negotiations took 
place between Buhari and President Jammeh in Banjul (The Gambia) without success. 




He claimed that peace in The Gambia depended on the reorganization of a new free, fair and 
democratic presidential election that would reflect the true will of the Gambian people.  
               Buhari took Adama Barrow with him, on January 13, 2017, to the 27th France-Africa 
Summit, held in Bamako (Mali). Adama Barrow participated in the 27th France-Africa Summit 
as President-elect of The Gambia recognized by ECOWAS and France.  At the conclusion of the 
27th France-Africa Summit,  ECOWAS Head of States and Government decided to implement 
their decision, taken in Abuja (Nigeria) to “take all necessary measures to strictly enforce the 
results of the 1st December 2016 elections” (ECOWAS Communique, December 2016).   
 
    The Heads of State and Government agreed to form and deploy the ECOMIG at the 
conclusion of the 27th France-Africa Summit.  The AU Peace and Security Council issued a 
statement confirming that as of January 19, 2017 the AU would no longer recognize Jammeh as 
the legitimate President of The Gambia. Hartmann reports “ECOWAS Chiefs of Staff gathered 
in Abuja on January 14th, 2017 to discuss the preparations for the establishment of the ECOWAS 






Arrival of ECOMIG forces in Banjul (The Gambia) on January 21st 2017: Senegalese Troops 
Source: Jeune Africa Newspaper 
https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/398057/politique/gambie-retour-dernieres-heures-roi-jammeh/ 
 
A Nigerian Army Officer member of ECOMIG forces discussing with civilians in Banjul (The Gambia) on 
January 25st 2017: 




                 The African Union Peace and Security Council and the United Nations Security 
Council resolutions facilitated ECOMIG’s formation and authorized its deployment. A 
Senegalese Army General Francois Ndiaye chaired the joint leadership of the ECOMIG forces. 
On January 17, 2017, ECOMIG Senegalese Infantrymen started to move towards Farafenny, a 
town on the northern border between Senegal and The Gambia. On January 17, 2017, President 
Jammeh declared a state of emergency in The Gambia and deployed the Gambian Armed Forces 
(GAF) in Banjul strategic locations and in other cities like Yundum, Birkama and Kanilai. That 
same day, President Jammeh urged the Gambian Parliament, where his APRC party held the 
majority of seats, to extend his mandate for three more months. On January 18, 2017, ECOMIG 
troops comprised of Senegalese Special Forces with contingents of infantrymen from Ghana, 
Nigeria, Mali and Togo gathered in Senegal. 
         On the afternoon of January 18, 2017, Senegalese Special Forces and the Togolese Army 
arrived, by road, in Farafenny. At the same time, the Nigerian Air Force started its flyovers 
above the Gambian territory to intimidate the GAF. The Nigerian Navy deployed its warships 
around the Senegalese territorial waters and placed the Gambia under a blockade. The 
ECOWAS forces were ready to intervene in The Gambia. ECOMIG forces managed to prevent 
President Jammeh from implementing his military strategy to stay in power. President Yaya 
Jammeh was aware of the expiration of his constitutional mandate on January 18, 2017, and 
Jammeh was also fully informed about ECOMIG military strategies. President Jammeh visited 
numerous ethnic leaders, tribal establishments and other religious congregations to seek 




Despite President Jammeh’s call to arms, no civilians enlisted in the Gambian Army. On 
January 18, 2017, the Gambian National Assembly met and passed a resolution to extend 
Jammeh’s mandate for three more months.  
        The ECOMIG Joint Task-Force, (comprising ECOWAS, UNOWAS and the AU and a 
military leadership from Member States) was set up in Dakar to coordinate events in The 
Gambia. Mr. Marcel A. de Souza, ECOWAS High Commissioner sent a last warning to 
President Jammeh. ECOWAS High Commissioner De Souza informed Jammeh that ECOMIG 
forces would enter The Gambia on January 19th ,  2017, at midnight. This was the same day 
that Adama Barrow was scheduled to be sworn in as President of the country at the Gambian 
High Commission in Dakar, Senegal in the presence of the majority of ECOWAS Heads of 
States. Gambian ambassadors to the UN in New York and Geneva, the USA, Senegal, France 
and Germany and senior military officers issued a collective statement calling on President 
Jammeh to step down. The statement was presented to the UN Security Council. 
              At dawn on January 19, 2017, ECOMIG forces invaded The Gambia and “sporadic 
fighting on the Gambian territory involved Senegalese troops and MFDC rebel units from 
Casamance.” (Hartman, 2017, page 90). Approximatively, 7,000 troops as well as air and naval 
assets from Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal entered The Gambia (Williams, 2017, page 2).  The 
Gambia’s Army Chief of Defence Staff, Lieutenant General Ousman Badgie was very aware of 
the strength of ECOMIG battalions and its firepower. Lt-General Badgie made a public 
statement pledging allegiance to the sworn President Adama Barrow and declared that his 
forces would not fight against ECOMIG forces. Lieutenant General Ousman Badgie ordered 





                 ECOMIG’s progress towards Banjul, the capital of The Gambia was stopped by “a 
last-minute negotiation by Mauritania’s President and Former Army General Mohammed Ibn 
Abdel Aziz, Guinea Conakry’s President Alpha Conde and UN Special Representative for 
West Africa in Senegal (UNOWAS), Mohamed Ibn Chambas.” (Hartmann: 2017: 90). 
President Jammeh agreed to step down and made a last public speech on early morning of 
January 21, 2017, via the Gambian National Television to express his thanks to the Gambian 
people. He proclaimed that he decided to relinquish the mantle of power in order “to preserve 
in every instance and in every circumstance the lives of Gambians” and that “it is not necessary 
that a single drop of blood is spent.” (Jammeh, last speech, January 20, 2017). Equatorial 
Guinea offered asylum to Former President Jammeh and Chadian President Idris Deby Itno 
provided his personal cargo plane for Jammeh’s transportation. ECOMIG forces were already 
on the outskirts of the city of the capital city, Banjul and President Jammeh stepped down on 
January 21, 2017. 
            According to The Gambia 2017 Human Rights Report by the US Embassy in Dakar, 
“76,000 individuals reportedly fled to neighboring countries, the large majority of those going 
to Senegal; 75% of them were women and children” (HRW: 2017). An ECOWAS-AU-UN 
declaration was issued on January 21, 2017, praising the peaceful resolution of The Gambian 
constitutional crisis. President Adama Barrow returned to The Gambia on January 26, 2017, 




D: Role of the United Nations 
The success of ECOMIG depended on coordination and cooperation among ECOWAS, 
the AU and the UNSC. The Gambia case study shows the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy 
carried out by the UN, AU and ECOWAS. UN Agencies have long suffered under the Jammeh 
administration. Many restraining orders were issued against the United Nations High 
Commission for Human Rights (UNCHR). The Jammeh administration also refused to facilitate 
visits requested by the Special Rapporteurs on Torture and on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions in November 2014. On October 15, 2015, UN General Assembly elected 
Senegal, Egypt, Japan and Uruguay as non-permanent members of UNSC, for two-year terms, 
beginning January 1, 2016 (UN/DPI communiqué, 2015).  
As a member of the UNSC, Senegal was able to request the UNSC to meet about urgent 
matters in the region, in the case of The Gambia. Also, in a letter S/2016/89, dated 28 January 
2016, the President of the Security Council exchanged views with the UN Secretary-General 
about the political and security situation in West Africa and in the Sahel region. The President of 
the Security Council recommended the use of preventive diplomacy by the United Nations 
Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) to solve the Gambian crisis. In a letter dated 
10 February 2016, the President of the Security Council informed the UN Secretary-General that 
the Council had decided to send a mission to West Africa (Mali, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal). 
The President of the Security Council communicated, the composition of the mission and its 
terms of reference to the Secretary-General in a letter referenced S/2016/215, dated 7 March 
2016. The same letter explained that the intent of the mission was to assess conditions for free, 
fair, peaceful, inclusive and credible presidential elections in the Niger, Benin, Cabo Verde, 




The same mission was assigned to discuss matters about the political situation in Chad. 
The UNSC report regarding the mission sent to Senegal, Guinea-Bissau and Mali was released 
under S/2016/511, dated 11 May 2016. The mission was also assigned to express the support of 
the Council to the cooperation between ECOWAS, the United Nations Office for West Africa 
and the Sahel (UNOWAS), the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), 
the Lake Chad Basin Commission, and other relevant multilateral and regional organizations to 
assist the region to address its political and security challenges (UNSC report S/2016/511, dated 
11 May 2016). 
     According to Amnesty International’s report in 2016, “the UN, AU and ECOWAS also 
undertook a joint mission to Banjul in May 2016 to assess compliance with regional and sub-
regional standards on elections, democracy, human rights and governance in the Gambia.” 
(Amnesty International, 2016). Conclusions of that report raised concerns over arrests of 
civilians and opposition figures on May 14 and 16, 2016. The three organizations urged The 
Gambia to guarantee conditions for independent and credible investigations.  
         On December 9, 2016, Senegal’s Foreign Minister, Mankeur Ndiaye, speaking on a 
Senegalese television station Tele Futurs Medias (TFM), also asked President Jammeh to respect 
the election verdict and “solemnly” warned him not to harm Senegal’s interests or its citizens in 
the The Gambia. Minister Ndiaye also mentioned that Senegal would call for an emergency 
meeting of the UN Security Council about The Gambia. The United Nations supported 
ECOWAS’ efforts to establish constitutional rule in the Gambia and to guarantee the safety and 
the rights of former President Jammeh (in accordance with the 1997 Gambian Constitution about 




      The United Nations Security Council issued a Presidential statement, S/PRST/2016/9, dated 
21 December 2016 to welcome decisions made by ECOWAS at its 50th Summit on December 
17, 2016 in Abuja (Nigeria) regarding the Gambian electoral crisis. On January 13, 2017, 
Mohamed Ibn Chambas, UN Special Representative for West Africa and in the Sahel based in 
Senegal (UNOWAS), briefed the Security Council about the latest developments on the ground. 
(ref: S/PRST/2017/2, dated 20 January 2017). Following Chambas’ briefing, the Security 
Council supported ECOWAS’ decisions to cease recognizing Jammeh as President of The 
Gambia, on January 19, 2017. (ref: S/PRST/2017/2, dated 20 January 2017).  In addition, the 
UNSC commended the efforts of the African Union and ECOWAS, as well as Member States in 
West Africa and in the Sahel to strengthen border security and regional cooperation. (ref: 
S/PRST/2017/2, dated 20 January 2017). Mr. Chambas was also assigned by the UNSC to 
support ECOWAS initiatives to facilitate negotiations and to ensure a peaceful transfer of power 
from outgoing President Jammeh to the President-elect Adama Barrow. 
      The United Nations Security Council accepted the requests of Senegal and the African Union 
for an emergency meeting. The UNSC adopted resolution S/RES/2337 (2017) during its 7866th 
meeting on 19 January 2017. The resolution S/RES/2337 “endorses the ECOWAS and the 
African Union decisions to recognize Mr. Adama Barrow as President of the Gambia and calls 
upon the countries in the region and the relevant regional organizations to cooperate with 
President Barrow in his efforts to realize the transition of power.” (UNSCR 2337 (2017)). On 
January 25, 2017, Security Council members received a follow-up briefing, via video 




E: Lessons Learned 
      This Gambian case study demonstrates the effectiveness of cooperation among ECOWAS, 
AU and the United Nations. Paul  D Williams (2017) cites a statement by Ghana President Nana 
Akufo-Addo on January 18, 2017, that  summarizes the mission’s purpose: “ECOMIG’s 
objective was to create an enabling environment for the effective enforcement of the rule of law, 
and, in accordance with the Constitution of The Gambia, facilitate the inauguration of the 
President-Elect, Adama Barrow, on Thursday January 19, 2017.” (IPI: Williams: 2017, online).  
Williams praises the solidarity of ECOWAS Member States in restoring constitutional order in 
The Gambia. In fact, ECOMIG’s force Commander, General Francois Ndiaye, explained on 
January 31, 2017, that the mission’s three-part mandate was “to uphold the results of the 
presidential election of December 1, 2016; ensure that the president-elect was sworn into office 
on January 19, 2017, in conformity with the constitution of the Republic of The Gambia; and 
ensure the safety of President Barrow, political leaders and the entire population.” (IPI: 
Williams: 2017, online). ECOMIG carried out successfully its mandate in The Gambia. 
This chapter reviews the efficiency of ECOWAS in maintaining peace and order during the 2016 
Gambian presidential election through a combination of diplomacy and military intervention. I 
argue that the United Nations learned lessons from Liberia’s first civil war about how best to 
provide assistance through preventive diplomacy to support free and fair elections and peaceful 
transition of power in West Africa. The United Nations Security Council involved all relevant 
regional (the African Union) and sub-regional organizations (ECOWAS) in the discussions about 
the crisis in The Gambia. Each of ECOMIG’s components demonstrated full commitment to 




argument in support to Lise Morjé Howard’s assertion (Howard, 2007) that UN Headquarters 
and UNSC interests to matters discussed facilitate their rapid solutions. The UN Security 
Council’s interests in the post-election crisis facilitated funding of the ECOMIG deployment and 
UNSC resolutions provided legitimacy to the initiatives taken by the AU and ECOWAS. 
         The deployment of ECOMIG facilitated the implementation of the UNSC resolution calling 
on all sides to exercise restraint in order to ensure peace. The presence of Senegal at the Security 
Council certainly played a major role in bringing the urgency of The Gambia crisis to the 
attention of the members of the UNSC. The United Nations Security Council resolution on The 
Gambia enabled all parties involved to participate in a peaceful transfer of power. UNSC 
meetings sent a strong message to potential dictatorships in the region that they are expected to 
respect their constitutions. The UNSC resolution and presidential statement generated support to 
UNOWAS leadership in the region for its efforts to settle peacefully the Gambian crisis.          
           UNOWAS’ tremendous contribution to monitor the 2016 presidential election concluded 
a series of events that intended to prevent chaos in the West African region. A new era started in 
The Gambia with President Jammeh’s peaceful departure and the formal inauguration of Adama 
Barrow as democratically elected president. President Adama Barrow established a Joint 
Transition Team, on February 15, 2017, with the support of UNOWAS to ensure a smooth and 
peaceful transition. In February 18, 2017, President Adama Barrow took his oath of office during 
an independence celebration in Banjul (The Gambia) under the protection of ECOMIG forces.  
The original mandate was adopted by the 51st ordinary session of the Authority held on Sunday 
June 4, 2017 in Monrovia, Liberia. (ECOWAS: April 2017). Even today, President Jammeh still 




in The Gambia. In addition, the current trials of former officials of Jammeh regime may generate 
frustration and unpredictable events. On April 21, 2017, ECOWAS forces clashed with Gambian 
soldiers loyal to President Jammeh, shooting and injuring three who were guarding graves at his 
home. The Gambia Armed Forces spokesperson said there was a misunderstanding and an 
investigation is in progress. In a separate event, one civilian was killed during a protest against 
ECOWAS forces while another civilian and an ECOMIG officer were injured on 2 June 2017. 
Twenty-two arrests were made in connection with that event. On June 2, 2017, Senegalese 
soldiers in Kanilai also wounded nine, shot dead one protester, as they opened fire on protesters 
in "self-defense" during an uprising in which thousands demonstrated against the heavy 
ECOMIG military presence in their community. 
        Twelve out of the fifteen Heads of State and Government of the Community voted to 
maintain ECOMIG for the protection of the Gambian Cabinet members, diplomats and other 
administrative leadership and security in The Gambia. Those were reasons for the extension of 
ECOMIG mandate until June 9, 2019. The ECOMIG deployment protected the principles 





ECOMIG Headquarters based in Senegal:    Source: ECOWAS website 
         The ECOMIG caused President Jammeh to fail in his attempts to retain power after losing a 
free and fair election and set an example in the West Africa region. ECOWAS Member States 
were unified in their efforts toward a common goal: enforcing the rule of law and ensuring the 
respect of the will of the people. ECOWAS reminds all Heads of State in the region of their 
obligation to respect provisions 23 (4) of the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance and the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, 
adopted in 2001. In this particular case, ECOMIG successfully removed a dictator and enforced 
the civilians’ will for change. Forcing President Jammeh to leave peacefully power was a great 
achievement by ECOMIG.  Thomas Weiss states “UN peacekeepers are now being asked to 
meet the challenge of intra-state conflicts, assist in civil administration, and protect humanitarian 




peacekeeping operation as interposition of a neutral force between two warring states once a 
ceasefire had been agreed to.” (Weiss, 1995).  
      In comparison with the Liberia situation, ECOWAS Heads of State and Government were 
unified in their efforts to ensure a peaceful transition of power in The Gambia. Their resolve in 
the Gambia crisis reassured the international community and convinced major powers such as 
the USA and the European Union (EU) to support their collective efforts. The EU contributed 
over seven millions euros to support ECOMIG efforts. The Gambia’s Chief of Defence Staff 
(CDS) Major-General Yankuba Drammeh was nominated by President Adama Barrow to replace 
CDS Lieutenant General Ousman Badgie. The Gambian new CDS thanked ECOWAS, on many 
occasions, for deploying ECOMIG, and the Nigerian Banks for their efforts in enhancing the 
welfare of the Gambians and the troops.  The use of diplomacy worked in the case of The 
Gambia, maybe due to the presence of Senegal, an ECOWAS Member State, at the time of the 
conflict to the Security Council. Consequently, the creation of the tripartite mechanism can 
facilitate an easy communication with UNSC, AU and ECOWAS respective leadership. The 
success of ECOMIG in The Gambia proved that a diplomatic/military option by sub-regional 
organizations, with the support of the UN can be effective in preventing temptations by 
governments to circumvent the popular vote. The efficiency of ECOMIG affirmed the necessity 
to create a permanent mechanism, including components from the United Nations, the African 
Union and ECOWAS and based in the West African region. The proposal of a permanent 





Chapter V:  Policy recommendations 
A: Evaluation of the role of the UN in both case studies in West Africa 
This chapter summarizes my conclusions regarding UN contributions to bring peace to the 
ECOWAS region and recommends the creation of a new partnership to provide timely 
peacekeeping operations in West Africa.  
The United Nations recognizes that it is not well suited to undertake peace-keeping or 
counterterrorism operations in situations where conflicts are on-going. (United Nations HIPPO 
report, 2015).  In the case of Liberia’s first civil war, the first UN resolution was issued three 
years after the beginning of the hostilities and the deployment of ECOMOG forces. This delay 
hindered ECOWAS’ efforts to contain NPFL strategies. Unfortunately, Liberian leader Charles 
Taylor heavily criticized the ECOMOG deployment over its actions and the legitimacy of its 
mission. However, after Charles Taylor was forced out of office in 2003, the UN worked with 
ECOWAS in taking on a more active and positive role.  
      In the case of The Gambia, the UNSC, with the support of the AU’s Peace and Security 
Council (AUPSC), adopted a resolution, in less than twenty days, after the first public statement 
by ECOWAS. This timely action by the UNSC was critical to the success of the ECOWAS 
mission. The joint actions by UN/AU/ECOWAS showed a willingness to prevent the 
destabilization of the region. The West-African sub-region is already traumatized with violence 





B: Assessment of the UN’s current roles in West Africa 
               As early as 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, called upon regional 
organizations to relieve the pressure on UN peacekeeping operations by taking the lead in 
regional conflicts. UNSG Boutros-Ghali stated “moreover, should the Council choose 
specifically to authorize a regional arrangement or organization to take the lead in addressing a 
crisis within its region, that could serve to lend the weight of the United Nations to the validity of 
the regional effort. “ (UN Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council: Agenda For Peace, 
1992, 825).  UNSG Boutros-Ghali understood very early that regional organizations must be 
very involved in the resolutions of crises within their regions.  
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This map shows also that major peacekeeping efforts are still ongoing in West Africa. The 
United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) successfully completed its mandate on 30 
June 2017, bringing closure to many years of civil war. The United Nations has learned a great 
deal from civil wars in West Africa, including Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea 
Bissau, Mali and from the political crisis in The Gambia. In both Liberia and The Gambia case 
studies, the United Nations has made much progress in supporting ECOWAS resolutions.  
           During the 70th Session of the General Assembly, the UN Secretary General (UNSG) Ban 
Ki-moon transmitted a report, on September 2, 2015, to the President of the UN General 
Assembly (UN-GA) and the President of the UN Security Council, by the High-Level 
Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO). José Ramos-Horta, the former Head of State 
of Timor-Leste, chaired the Panel. The HIPPO report reflects extensive consultations with 
Member States, regional and sub-regional organizations, civil society, research organizations and 
all relevant entities within the broad UN system. In his transmittal letter to the President of the 
GA, The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated “the Security Council has at times been 
hesitant to consider crises at an early stage. The good offices of the Secretary-General have 
proven to be a preventive tool.” (UN HIPPO report A/7095-S/2015/446, 2015, 8). 
         Currently there are two major UN-led peacekeeping operations in the ECOWAS region: 
the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and the United 
Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). MINURSO 
was established by Security Council resolution 690, dated 29 April 1991 in accordance with 
settlement proposals accepted on 30 August 1988 by Morocco and the Frente Popular para la 
Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO). (United Nations website). 




established by Security Council resolution 2100, dated 25 April 2013 to support political 
processes in Mali and to carry out a number of tasks in support of the implementation of the 
2015 Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali.  (United Nations website). The Security 
Council unanimously adopted the resolution 2423 (2018) under Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter to extend the MINUSMA’s mandate through June 30, 2019.  
C: ECOWAS contributions to the success of UN Peace Operations 
Howard argues that the three components of successful peacekeeping operations are “the consent 
of the warring parties for the UN operation, consensual but moderately intense Security Council 
interests, and the first-level organizational learning in the UN Secretariat’s peacekeeping 
operation.” (Howard, 2008, page 327). Therefore, the UN may have been delayed entering 
Liberia due to lack of interest by the Security Council, considerations related to sovereignty, and 
the absence of a request to intervene by parties involved.  
           However, since the late 1990s, ECOWAS, has taken actions to prevent civil wars within 
its Member States. The initiative of ECOWAS and ECOMOG’s timely deployment saved lives 
and prevented casualties on all sides during the Liberia’s fist civil war. The UN and AU 
resolutions were adopted after time-consuming sessions and there would have been many more 
casualties if ECOWAS had waited. That demonstrates the necessity for effective cooperation 
among the three entities to manage current crises and prevent outbreaks of violence in the future.     
           The contributions of ECOWAS Member States to the successful outcomes of UN 
operations was greatly appreciated by the international community. (resolution 788 (1992) on 
Liberia, resolution 1132 (1997) on Sierra Leone, resolution 1528 (2004) on Cote d’Ivoire to 
name a few).   The report entitled “Lessons from ECOWAS Peacekeeping Operations: 1990-




11th of February 2005. The report recommended that the United Nations should cooperate with 
ECOWAS in order to be effective in carrying out its obligation to “guarantee peace and security 
around the world” (UN Charter), especially in West Africa. From my review of the experiences 
in Liberia and The Gambia, I have concluded that the United Nations should recognize that 
regional organizations are capable of playing major roles in preventing civil crises and restoring 
constitutional order and peace. 
 
D: The creation of a triangular mechanism of cooperation among UN, AU and ECOWAS 
        Ian Martin states “ while the UN peacekeeping model is not found to  be well-suited to  
enforcement, counter-terrorism or trans-national operations, the AU, sub-regional  organisations 
and ad hoc regional coalitions have developed capabilities designed to  address these challenges. 
These African capabilities help relieve the pressure on the UN to conduct such operations.” 
(Cedric de Coning, 2018, 225).  Observers also note that in a world full of emerging threats, 
“partnership peacekeeping has become the norm. This entails collaboration on active military 
operations between two or more multilateral institutions or various bilateral actors. (CSR: 
2018:6). 
        In fact, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and AU Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahama 
organized, on July 9, 2018, a joint press conference in Addis-Ababa (Ethiopia) following the 
closing of the 12th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting of the UN Security Council and the AU 
Peace and Security Council. (Forti and Connolly: 2018, 1). Both leaders signed the 2017 Joint 
UN-AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security. This instrument facilitated 
the contributions of African troops, representing 49 per cent of UN forces deployed in 




actions to prevent regional or sub-regional conflicts and align strategies on politically sensitive 
situations in Africa. I argue that, while the UN has a very productive mechanism of cooperation 
with the AU, a joint and permanent mechanism among the UN, The AU and the ECOWAS is 
required in order to implement the recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on 
Peace Operations. Such a triangular arrangement or partnership should be based in West Africa. 
The governance structure should include a representative of UNOWAS on behalf of the UN, a 
Permanent Representative from the ECOWAS Peace and Security Commission (ECOWAS-
PSC) and a Permanent Representative from the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC).   
         This chapter concludes a joint mechanism that includes regional organizations should 
manage Peacekeeping Operations in West Africa. Peace operations would be shorter, more 
efficient and cost-effective with the rapid mobilization of ECOWAS’ manpower and military 
assets. This joint mechanism would facilitate the timely implementation of resolutions taken by 
the ECOWAS Emergency Meeting of Heads of States and Government, AUPSC and the UNSC, 
pursuant to requests for intervention by offices on the ground.  
        As of now, it is crucial that the UN cooperate with regional organizations such as ECOWAS 
to benefit from their full understanding and thorough knowledge of the host country and for the 
deployment of an effective ECOWAS force. When first-level the UN with the cooperation of 
ECOWAS successfully achieves learning of a crisis, then appropriate measures can be proposed 
by UN/AU/ECOWAS representatives and approved by the UNSC. The proposed mechanism 
would  be funded  in part by international  donors with the support of the UN Secretariat-
General, the AU Commission for Peace and Security and the High Commission of ECOWAS.  
         The creation of a permanent mechanism could have the capabilities to gather the Chiefs of 




therefore guarantee a rapid mobilization of troops, if necessary. I trust this mechanism can 
benefit by funding from donors with the support of the UN Secretariat-General Office, the AU 
Commission for Peace and Security and the High Commission of ECOWAS. 
             The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (2008) would guarantee the legitimacy 
of a rapid deployment of ECOWAS forces with the full support of the UN and the AU. The 
UN/AU/ECOWAS mechanism would be responsible for the mobilization and training of troops 
in accordance with UN standards and facilitate funding for military assets and operational 
capacities. The proposed mechanism UN/AU/ECOWAS would authorize ECOWAS to lead an 
intervention in West Africa as provided for by the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (CPMRPS), adopted by the 
Heads of State and Government on December 10, 1999 in Lome (Togo). ECOWAS has the right 
to intervene through military force if the ECOWAS SMC fails to use preventive diplomacy and 
persuade all involved parties. Article 49 (d) from the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework 
-ECOWAS-CPF- (regulation MSC/REG.1/01/2008), dated January 16th, 2008, explicitly states 
that “the Mediation and the Security Council may authorize the preventive deployment of 
ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) to  the territory of a Member State for the purpose of preventing 
the degeneration of conflict into  violence  or to serve as buffer between belligerents during 
periods of high tension, mediation or peace-keeping operations as stipulated by Article 27 of the 
Mechanism.” (ECOWAS-CPF, 2008, 25). 
              The UN/AU/ECOWAS mechanism would be responsible for the mobilization and 
training of troops in accordance with the UN standards and facilitate funding for military assets 
and operational capacities. The existing UN-AU partnership would ensure respect for UN 




level of supplies. As they share similar cultural backgrounds, ECOWAS forces would be in a 
better position to understand the social and cultural factors that are important to local ethnic or 
religious groups, including the protection of intangible cultural heritage and artefacts.         
Communication would not be a problem as the majority of the West African countries share 
regional languages. Regional forces would have an advantage in gathering intelligence that is 
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I believe that “responses to contemporary conflicts are increasingly robust and regional 
organizations are better equipped than the UN to execute them.” (Peter: 2019, 5). New types of 
threats in West Africa will challenge the capabilities of the United Nations to carry out 
peacekeeping operations in the region. For example, terrorist attacks by many groups in Mali 
caused high casualties among MINUSMA personnel. There is a threat of further casualties 
related to the continuing Boko Haram insurgency and instability in Niger, Nigeria and Burkina 
Faso. It is not only the efficiency, but also the legitimacy of the regional organization in the eyes 
of the regional governments and affected communities that plays a role in the success of 
peacekeeping operations.  
E: Operational Issues 
        Former UNSG Ban Ki-moon noted in the 2015 HIPPO report that “the international peace 
and security responsibilities shouldered by the African Union and regional economic 
communities and regional mechanisms in Africa have grown enormously in recent years. They 
represent a significant human and financial burden.” The question of funding is always a 
challenge to ECOWAS peacekeeping operations. The African Union does not have the financial 
resources to support a multinational peacekeeping operation; it can cover only twenty-five per 
cent of its current obligations. The AU relies on international financial support to implement 
peacekeeping operations in Africa.  Therefore, a reliable funding mechanism would have to be 
established.  The joint UN/AU/ECOWAS mechanism could mobilize financial resources through 
the UN, as was the case in The Gambia.  However, the UN General Assembly is the body that 





        This institutional  framework could have legal capacities and diplomatic attributions, 
transferred  by the UN Secretary-General  to discuss, mediate, negotiate, fund and  decide on 
various issues related peace and security in ECOWAS region under the joint leadership  of the 
UNOWAS Permanent Representative, the ECOWAS High-Commissioner or his/her 
Representative,  the President of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee or his/her 
representative and the AU Peace and Security  Commissioner or his/her representative. The 
cooperation among UN, AU and ECOWAS troops would help to incorporate the contributions of 
traditional leaders in the host country.  
        The UN should explore the possibility of appointing an Under-Secretary-General of the 
United Nations or a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to lead the (UN/AU/ 
ECOWAS) mechanism.  The UNOWAS can also assist the appointed Under-Secretary-General 
of the United Nations or a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to lead the 
(UN/AU/ ECOWAS) mechanism and represent him/her depending on the workload to the 
number of side-meetings during mediation and negotiation. 
          Finally, there is a large body of commentary recommending a more formal arrangement 
for coordinating peace operations undertaken by the UN, the AU and ECOWAS. The success of 
recent preventive action in The Gambia in 2016 should convince the leadership of the respective 
organizations – UN, AU, and ECOWAS - to explore the possibility of establishing the proposed 









ECOWAS was created in 1975 to promote economic integration among the Member States and 
to support cooperation for economic growth and development.  Since the 1990s, its mission has 
been expanded to include peacekeeping operations and missions to support ECOWAS Member 
States in their efforts to become stable, constitutional democracies. All ECOWAS Member 
States are committed to the principles of the UN Charter. ECOWAS has made progress in 
negotiating political commitments among Member States in the area of peace and security.  The  
adoption of the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, 
Peacekeeping and Security (CPMRPS), adopted by the Heads of State and Government on 
December 10, 1999, in Lome (Togo) and the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework -
ECOWAS-CPF (regulation MSC/REG.1/01/2008), dated January 16th, 2008, are examples of 
that progress.  
       In addition, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali understood very early that 
regional organizations must be very involved in the resolutions of crises within their regions. 
Former UN Secretary-General  Kofi A. Annan also used his goodwill to prevent bloodshed in 
West Africa. Former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon instructed the evaluation of 
peacekeeping operations around the World. The United Nations recognized ECOWAS 
contributions to the success of UN peacekeeping operations (HIPPO 2015). The signing of 2017 
Joint UN-AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security between the UN and 
the AU and the closing statements by the current UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and 
AUPSC Commissioner Moussa Faki Mahama at the 12th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting of 
the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council, on July 9, 2018 demonstrate 




         I explored the UN/ECOWAS cooperation during the first Liberian crisis (1989-1990) with 
the first deployment of ECOMOG. Also, through my research I found evidence that the 
partnership among the UN, the AU and ECOWAS during The Gambia’s crisis in 2016 was 
successful.  More positively the sustained interest and cooperation of the UNSC was essential to 
the success of the ECOMIG deployment in the Gambia. I concluded that the establishment of a 
proposed triangular UN/AU/ECOWAS would enhance the authority of the UN in West Africa. 
At least two ECOWAS Member States, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire, will organize national 
elections in the near future. Both countries are experiencing internal conflicts that could lead to 
pre- or post-electoral violence if preventive actions are not taken by sub-regional (ECOWAS), 
regional (AU) and international actors (UN) in a timely fashion. The proposed mechanism would 
generate effective actions through preventive diplomacy and, if needed, authorize and jointly 
manage the deployment of ECOWAS forces, where required, to ensure peace and security in 
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